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LEGISLATION
UNET XPLOYMENT INSURANCE-NEW YORK UNEM1PLOYMENT INSURANCE LAW.
-The recently enacted unemployment insurance law of New York State'
constitutes another unit in a growing framework of social insurance legislation.
The term "social insurance" is generally used to describe those measures, usually
legislative, which are taken for the assistance of the worker and his dependents
when gainful employment is interrupted or stopped, as by sickness, death or
unemployment.2 Workmen's accident compensation laws, such as have been
enacted by a majority of the states,3 are typical applications of the principles
of social insurance. These laws partake of the nature of insurance in that the
incidence of loss is distributed among many, and is not borne solely by the
individual suffering the loss,4 and in that the right to compensation for loss
is a legal right, not a matter of gratuity. Further, the insurance is social in
its nature in that the coverage includes persons "collectively rather than indi-
vidually."6
The Need for Unemployment Imisrance
It is not the purpose here to discuss the thesis of social insurance in its en.
tirety, but to treat of a particular application of the social insurance principle,
namely unemployment insurance. The discussion is further limited to the com-
pulsory and nation-wide or state-wide systems, rather than those private plans
which are confined to a single company, industry, or locality.7 The kind of
unemployment insurance system with which we are concerned is one in which,
first, a fund is built up by regular contributions from employer, employee, or
the government, or all of these together; second, contributions to the fund are
compulsory; third, the plan is administered by a body having legal authority;
and fourth, benefits are payable to the unemployed worker as a matter of
right.
Constant debate is provoked by the question of whether unemployment in-
surance is a necessary or even salutary step in our economic system.8 There
1. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 468, N. Y. LABOR LAw (1935) §§ 500-531.
2. Eps-mx, Ihswnu=vrr, A CHALLxarzGE To Ammc (1933) 23.
3. Only two states, Arkansas and Aissippi, have failed to enact workmen's accident
compensation laws. 25 Am. LAB. Lro. Rv. 75 (1935).
4. Epsrn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 22.
5. This is the chief distinction between unemployment insurance and unemployment
relief. EpsTE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 22.
6. Firth, Social Insurance (Apr. 1931) 59 Sasmx= 269.
7. Private plans, a few of which are in existence today in the United States, are
necessarily limited in their scope and coverage. They are similar to employees' mutual
benefit associations, although in some instances the employer contributes to the fund. For
a discussion of the plans, see STmwART, UYEiwnLo, ,rNr Br-Nrrs =e Tm UrnrzD SrATzs
(1930).
8. For theses in favor of unemployment insurance as the best method of meeting the
problem of industrial unemployment, see ARLIsno.G, Izsuaneo Tim Essar-n=s (1929);
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is a similar disagreement as to whether unemployment insurance can ever be
established on a sound actuarial basis.9 One unchanging fact, however, admits
of no denial. There is such a thing as mass unemployment. The phenomenon
is present in good times and in bad.19 The number alone varies as we pass
from prosperity to depression." Periods of business depression, such as we are
presently experiencing, account for only one kind of unemployment, called
cyclical unemployment.1 2  There are other kinds,--for example, technological
unemployment, 3 caused by change in industrial methods or change of styles;
seasonal unemployment, 1 4 caused by the seasonal nature of the business, as
in the clothing industry; personality unemployment, 0 caused by the personal
inaptitude of the worker. All these types of unemployment are permanent and
recurring, and are seemingly rooted into our economic structure.10 Since the
existence of the economic evil is beyond question, it goes without saying that
it is expedient that some means be taken to prevent or at least palliate that
evil.' 7 The means which is being taken today is compulsory unemployment
insurance.18
European Systems
The unemployment insurance idea is said to have been derived from the
practice of certain European trade unions which allowed benefits to members
during periods of unemployment.'9 In the year 1900 the city of Ghent In
Belgium first launched a system of unemployment insurance on a large scale by
offering subsidies to labor unions which allowed their members unemployment
RuBnnow, TE QUEST FOR SECURTY (1934); EPsTEIN, op. cit. supra note 2. For an ad-
verse criticism and analysis of unemployment insurance, see NATIONAL AssOCIATION o
MANUFACTURERS, PUBLIC UNEFPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1930).
9. The difficulty in placing unemployment insurance on a working actuarial basis lies
in the imponderable nature of unemployment as a risk, and the dispute largely concerns
the accuracy of available employment statistics. A collocation of authority pro and con
may be found in HALL, CURRENT CONFLICTING Vinws ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1931).
10. DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1933) 2.
11. Ibid.
12. EPSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 225.
13. Id. at 228.
14. Id. at 223.
15. RuBiNow, THE QUEST FOR SECURITY (1934) 312. This type of unemployment differs
from the others in that the cause is individual, rather than social. Often the worker is
totally unemployable, and is properly the subject of relief rather than Insurance.
16. EpsmN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 241.
17. It is argued that unemployment insurance plans, such as are being enacted Into
law today, would prevent the spread of unemployment during business depresslons by
increasing public confidence and purchasing power. DOUGLAs, op. cit, supra note 10, at 22,
18. See note 44, infra.
19. EPSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 324.
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benefits. 20  The practice spread generally throughout Belgium. -  This, of
course, was a voluntary, not a compulsory plan of insurance.
England was the first country to establish a compulsory, nation-wide un-
employment insurance system. This was accomplished in 1911 by the passage
of the National Insurance Act.22  Under this act contributions were payable
in almost equal amounts by the employer, the worker, and the Treasury.p
The fund was administered by the Board of Trade.2 4  The coverage, however,
was limited to only a few industries.25 In 1920 the act was repealed and was
supplanted by the Unemployment Insurance Act,20 which provided a much
broader coverage.27  This in turn was amended by the Unemployment Act of
1934, which separated unemployment relief from unemployment insurance. 2
An essential element of the English system is the establishment and maintenance
of employment centers or exchanges,2 0 whose duty it is not only to investigate
claims and pay benefits, but also to find employment for the applicant if pos-
sible, and to provide for vocational training.2 0 The maintenance of employment
exchanges is considered an integral part of the unemployment insurance idea.P'
The German insurance system, which closely resembles the English, came
into effect as a compulsory plan in 1927.32 Contributions are made by employers
and employees in equal amounts, and the state does not contribute to standard
20. This plan of insurance is known as the Ghent System. The original plan allowed
a municipal subsidy of ten thousand francs a year, which was later increased as the need
arose. The original benefits were one franc per diem for a period of not more than fifty
days. Benefits were payable only to union members. KaMM, U-rPLOYhM. ;T IusrMc
nz BEI=UI (1932) 88.
21. Id. at 92.
22. 1 & 2 Gao. V, c. 55 (1911). For an exhaustive treatise on English legislation and
experience, see GiLsoN, U1,ErPLoY- mN_ L, snNSa;s cx n; Gm%.xT BnrAr (1931).
23. 1 & 2 Go. V, c. 55, § 4 and Eighth Schedule (1911).
24. Id. § 92.
25. Apparently the object of the act was to insure only those trades which were physi-
cally hazardous. The occupations insured were building, construction, shipbuilding, mechan-
ical engineering, ironfounding, construction of vehicles, and sawmilling. 1 & 2 Gro. V,
c. 55, Sixth Schedule (1911).
26. 10 & 11 GEO. V, c. 30 (1920).
27. Id. First Schedule. The act covered all employments except agriculture, domestic
service, military service, certain government service, non-manual labor at a salary in excess
of £250 per year, and family employment.
28. 24 & 25 GEo. V, c. 29 (1934). The act is in two parts, part I dealing with unem-
ployment insurane, and part 1 with unemployment assistanue, or relief. The purpose is
to remove the stigma of the "dole" from unemployment insurance.
29. Free employment exchanges were provided in England as early as l90 by the
L.aou n Excma.G~s Acr, 9 EDW. VII, c. 7 (1909).
30. Training and rehabilitation are becoming increasingly important in the administra-
tion of insurance in England. DAVIsON, THE NEw UNTMPLOYmmT Lnsuixa' Acr (1934)
27 et seq.
31. Epsrznc, op. cit. supra note 2, at 272.
32. CAaOxr , Uzmas LoYmNzT IisuRaca nz G ,n r&a" (1929) 48.
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benefits. 3 3 Benefits are payable in eleven classifications regulated according
to the wage previously earned by the applicant,8 4 while in the English system
there is a flat rate of benefit.3 5 A further difference is that the German plan
is administered by an autonomous body, independent of the state.80 These
are compulsory systems. Unemployment insurance, either voluntary or com-
pulsory, is in effect in almost every European country today.81
The Development in the United States-The Social Security Act
In the United States, however, unemployment insurance laws are of very
recent origin. 3s A number of private company plans have been in operation
for some time,3 9 but the first compulsory law of state-wide application was
enacted in Wisconsin in 193 1.40 For a long time voices had been raised in favor
of unemployment insurance, but they had received scant attention from the
legislatures. 41 During the present economic crisis public attention has been
more sharply brought to a consideration of the question, and public opinion
has been reflected in the measures taken by the federal government.4 2 But
perhaps the strongest single impulse which the movement in the United States
received, was the consideration and enactment by Congress of the Social
Security Act of 1935. 43  Until 1935, Wisconsin was the only state having an
unemployment insurance law. At the present time, nine states and the District
of Columbia44 have enacted such laws, some contingent upon the passage of
33. Ibid. The state however, does contribute to relief benefits. The theory of the
German plan is that industry must pay for insurance, while relief is the problem of the
national and local governments.
34. Id. at 58.
35. DAVISON, op. cit. supra note 30, at 8. The advantage of a flat rate is that admin-
istration is greatly simplified. In the system of graduated benefits, the work of Investiga-
tion is increased.
36. CARROLL, op. cit. supra note 32, at 60.
37. For a summary treatment of all European systems see Epsra-=, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 324.
38. See note 44, infra. All except the Wisconsin act of 1931 have been enacted In 1935.
39. STEwART, op. cit. supra note 7.
40. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20.
41. See RuBiNow, SoAL NsURANcE (1913); Henderson, Insurance Against Unemtploy.
ment (1913) 3 Am. LAB. LEG. REV. 172; Halsey, Compulsory Unemployment Insurance in
Great Britain (1915) 5 id. at 265.
42. Several unemployment insurance measures were introduced at the Seventy-Fourth
Congress, the more prominent being: SmT. Bni. No. 1130, H. R. No. 4120, H. R. No. 4142
and H. R. No. 4539 (the administration Security Act); H. R. No. 2827 (Lundeen Bill);
H. R. No. 5545 (Ramspeck Bill); Sasr. BnL No. 214 (Logan Bill); H. R. No. 7260 (Social
Security Act).
43. P. L. No. 271, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935).
44. (Dist. Col.) P. L. No. 386, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935); Ala. (1935) Senate bill
no. 395, approved Sept. 14, 1935; Cal. Laws 1935, c. 352; Mass. Laws 1935, c. 479; N. H.
Laws 1935, c. 99, as amended by N. H. Laws 1935, c. 152; N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 468;
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federal legislation," others, like the New York law, to take effect independently.
In many of the remaining states such measures are pending in the legislaturesA0
The Social Security Act does not attempt to set up a nationally administered
system of insurance, but rather to promote action by the states themselves. It
provides for the allocation of federal money to those states which have unem-
ployment insurance laws conforming to certain standards set up in the Act
itself. 7 One of these standards requires that all moneys received from con-
tributions to state plans shall be turned over to a federal deposit, the unem-
ployment trust fund. 48 This fund will maintain separate accounts for each
state 9 A tax is imposed on certain employers, which will amount to three
per cent of the annual payrollP ° For the purposes of this tax, however, con-
tributions to a state unemployment fund are allowed as a credit up to ninety
per cent of the federal tax, 1 so that if an employer is contributing three per
cent of his payroll to a state fund, he will pay to the federal fund only an
additional three-tenths of one per cent of his payroll. This is probably the
most important feature of the act from the standpoint of achieving practical
results. The law does not compel the states to set up unemployment insurance
laws, but makes that course an expedient and desirable one. The Act creates
an agency to be known as the Social Security Board, whose function it will
be to supervise the operation of the Act generally. - Thus, although we have
not a compulsory national system, nevertheless the establishment of a central
fund, a central supervising agency, and a national system of standards, serves
to unify and consolidate the state laws into a coordinated body. The enact-
N. C. (1935) House bill no. 1507, approved May 11, 1935; Utah (1935) House bill no.
86, approved March 25, 1935; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 145; Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, as amended
by Wis. Laws 1933, cc. 186, 383, as amended by Wis. Laws 1935, cc. 192, 272, 446.
45. The following laws are contingent upon federal legislation: Cal. Laws 1935, c. 352;
Mass. Laws 1935, c. 479; N. H. Laws 1935, c. 99, as amended by N. H. Laws 1935, c. 142;
N. C. (1935) House bill no. 1507, approved May 11, 1935; Utah (1935) House bill no. 86,
approved March 25, 1935; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 145.
46. The following measures are pending: Ariz. (1935) House bill no. 206; Colo. (1935)
House bill no. 310; Conn. (1935) House bill no. 386; Del. (1935) Senate bill no. 18;
Ind. (1935) House bill no. 521; Md. (1935) Senate bill no. 312; Mich. (1935) House bill
no. 246; Minn. (1935) Senate bill no. 1242; Mo. (1935) Senate bill no. 98; Nev. (1935)
A. no. 279; N. Ml. (1935) H. M. no. 2; Ohio (1935) Senate bill no. 6; Okla. (1935) House
bill no. 6; Ore. (1935) House bill no. 329; Pa. (1935) House bill no. 2407; R. I. (1935)
House bill no. 748; Tenn. (1935) House bill no. 1387; Tex. (1935) House bill no. 409;
Wyom. (1935) Senate bill no. 116.
47. P. L. No. 271, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) tit. III, § 303. The purpose of the
standards is to secure uniformity in state legislation, and thus prevent advantage to indus-
tries in any one state.
48. Id. § 303 (4).
49. Id. tit. IX, § 904 (e).
50. Id. § 901. However, for the calendar year 1936 the tax will be 11, and for the
calendar year 1937, 2%. The tax applies only to employers of eight or more persons.
Id. § 907 (a).
51. Id. § 902.
52. Id. tit. VII, §§ 701, 702.
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ment of this law makes unemployment insurance a national undertaking, and
places squarely upon the several states "the responsibility of devising and
enacting measures which will result in the maximum benefits to the American
workman in the field of unemployment compensation." 58
State Legisltion-The New York Law
The New York law 4 is typical of unemployment legislation pending or
enacted in the different states. Employers and workers in every classification
of labor are- subject to the Act," with these exceptions: first, agricultural
employment; 6 second, family employment, that is, employment of a spouse
or minor child; 57 third, employment in religious, charitable, or educational
work;58 fourth, employment in a "white-collar" or non-manual occupation,
where the salary is more than fifty dollars a week;"0 and fifth, employment by
the state or any of its subdivisions.5 0 Similar exemptions are found in most
compulsory systems both in Europe and America. 0' A further exemption is
provided by that section of the act which defines an "employer" as one who
has regularly employed four or more persons for a given period.02 The effect
of this definition is to prefer the small employer by exempting him from con-
tribution.63 It is to be noted that the New York law does not provide exemp-
tion to domestic servants, and in this respect differs from most systems. 04 The
reason offered for this exemption, that unemployment among domestics is not
of a serious nature, may well be disputed.65
53. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, in a radio address delivered over the Columbia
Broadcasting System. N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1935, at 2.
54. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) §§ 500-531.
55. Id. § 502 (1).
56. Id. § 502 (1) (b) (1).
57. Id. § 502 (1) (b) (2).
58. Id. § 502 (1) (b) (3).
59. Id. § 502 (2).
60. Id. § 502 (3).
61. England: 10 & 11 GEG. V, c. 30, First Schedule, Part II (1920) ; Austria: CAR uoLL,
UNEMPLOYMENT INsuRANcE Ix AusmTiA (1932) 19, n. 43; Germany: CARROLL, UNENTaoy-
=ENT INsURANcE IN GEsAN (1929) 50; Cal. Laws 1935, c. 352, § 7; Mass. Laws 1935,
c. 479, § 1; N. H. Laws 1935, c. 99, § 1 (IV), (V), (VI); Wash. Laws 1935, c. 145,
§ 3 (6), (7); Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20,,§ 108.02 (d), (e). These exemptions are allowed
because unemployment is not considered serious in these occupations, and also to simplify
administration by excluding employment which is difficult to investigate.
62. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 502 (3).
63. The exemption of the small employer is based on administrative expediency, since
investigation of the business of the small employer is difficult. DouorAs, op. ch. supra
note 10, at 50.
64. Many systems exempt domestics from the operation of the plan. England: 10 & 11
Geo. V, c. 30, First Schedule, Part II (b) (1920); Austria: CARROLL, UNrMPLOYMINT
INsU RANcE N AusTRiA (1932) 19, n. 43; Cal. Laws 1935, c. 352, § 7 (b); Mass. Laws 1935,
c. 479, §§ 1 (a), 2; N. H. Laws 1935, c. 99, § 1 (VI) (b).
65. DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 49.
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Every employer subject to the act must contribute an annual sum, three per
cent of the total annual payroll, 66 to a state fund known as the unemployment
insurance fund.67 This is the compdsory feature of the law. No contributions
are to be paid by the state" or by employees, 9 which will mean that aside
from grants by the federal authority, the entire state fund will consist of con-
tributions from employers. This is a provision which is peculiar to unem-
ployment insurance in the United States. All European systems, with the
exception of the Soviet system,7 0 provide for joint contributions by employer
and employee, and sometimes by the government as well.7 ' The theory of joint
contributions is that the financial burden will be more equally distributed, and
also that the worker is made a part of the plan, and will feel that benefits are
his due as a matter of right.7 " The theory of contributions by the employer
alone first found legislative expression in the Wisconsin act.73 The elements
of this theory may be stated thus: first, employees are not financially able to
contribute; second, employers are best able to shoulder the expense of con-
tributions; and third, employers are responsible for unemployment, and therefore
should bear the cost.74 Whatever the merits or faults of this theory may be,
it seems to have met with the approval of law-making bodies.7 6
In order to obtain benefits an employee must first of all be totally unem-
ployed, as that term is defined in the law.70 As a further prerequisite, the
66. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 516. However, for the calendar year 1936 the con-
tribution will be 1%, and for the calendar year 1937, 2%,o. The purpose of this provi-on
is probably to have the fund built up gradually while the administrative machinery is
being organized.
67. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 514.
68. Id. § 529.
69. Id. § 517 provides that any agreement by an employee to contribute shall be void.
70. Duncan, Social Insurance in the Soviet Union (1935) 178 Am.s 182. The Soviet
State is the sole employer, and logically the sole contributor, since wages are generally paid
in commodities rather than in money.
71. England: 10 & 11 GEo. V, c. 30, § 5 (employer, employee and government); Ger-
many: CARROLL, UtNi£ozxwT IsA mu c n; Gnwr'," (1929) 48 (employer and em-
ployee in equal amounts); Austria: CARROL., U Lovam.N-T L';Suncx ,; AIVrx (1932)
18 (employer and employee in equal amounts). The California, cassachubsetts, New
Hampshire and Washington laws compel contributions by both employer and employee.
Cal. Laws 1935, c. 352, H3 38, 44; Mass. Laws 1935, c. 479, § 3; N. H. La%,s 1935, c. 99,
§§ 6, 12; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 145, § 5 (1), (5). Under the Wisconsin and New York
laws, the employer alone contributes. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, § 108.05; N. Y. Luon L.w
(1935) § 515.
72. E rs=u-, op. cit. supra note 2, at 38; DouGLAs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 149, 151.
73. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, § 108.01.
74. Commons, The Groves Unemployment Reserves Law (1932) 22 Anr. L.u. Lw. RE .
8; Green, Why Labor Opposes Forced Worker Contributions (1934) 24 id. at 101.
75. The theory is given effect in the Social Security Act as well as in the laws of New
York and Wisconsin. P. L. No. 271, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) tit. X, § 901 impos-,
a tax on employers alone for the unemployment trust fund.
76. N. Y. LABOR LAw (1935) § 502 (10) defines total unemployment as the total lack
of any gainful work and the total lack of income.
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applicant must prove that he has been employed for a certain period in the
past.7 7 The policy which underlies this requirement seems to incline toward
the restriction of payment of benefits to workers in the real sense, i.e., those who
have worked in the past and who are earnestly seeking employment. 78 There
are certain limitations on the amount and duration of benefit.70  These are
provided to assure the solvency of the fund, and are based on the recognized
theory that the greater number of the unemployed are idle for a relatively short
period of time. 0 Also in accordance with this theory, a "waiting period" of
three weeks intervenes between the filing of a notice of unemployment and the
commencement of benefits, thus allowing a period for seeking new employment.8 1
This period is also necessary for investigation by the administrative authorities,
to determine the validity of the claim.8 2  Where the employee has been dis-
charged for misconduct, the waiting period is longer.83 An employee who refuses
employment loses his right to benefits, but this rule is subject to certain
qualifications.8 4
The unemployment insurance law of New York is to be administered by
the state, through the industrial commissioner."s In addition, an advisory coun-
cil is created, consisting of the employers, the employees and the public.88 The
work of the council will not be administrative, but will be confined to study and
recommendation.8 7  The commissioner may set up local offices throughout the
state.8 8 These offices will act as employment exchanges in addition to func-
tioning as agencies for the distribution of benefits.89
All contributions received are to be deposited in the state unemployment
insurance fund.90 The contributions are pooled, and in contrast to the Wisconsin
plan0 ' are not kept in separate accounts for each employer. The "pool plan"
77. Id. § 503 (3) (c). The employee must have worked 90 days within the preceding
year, or 130 days within the preceding two years.
78. As to the wisdom of such a provision, see DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 57.
79. One week of benefit is given for each 15 days of employment within the preceding
year. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 503 (3) (e). The amount of weekly benefit Is 50%
of the employee's previous wage, or $15.00, whichever is lower. Id. § 505 (1). The em-
ployee may not have more than 16 weekly payments in one year. Id. § 507.
80. DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 129 (calculation based on census statistics).
81. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 504 (1).
82. For a general discussion of the waiting period see DouoAS, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 64.
83. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 504 (2) (a).
84. Id. § 506. The applicant is not disqualified If the employment offered would re-
quire his joining a company union, if there is an industrial dispute in progress, if excessive
expense of travel would be involved, or if the conditions are substantially less favorable
than prevailing working conditions in the locality.
85. Id. § 518 (1).
86. Id. § 518 (4).
87. Ibid.
88. Id. § 518 (2), (5).
89. Id. § 518 (5).
90. Id. § 514.
91. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, § 108.16 (2).
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has the advantage of greater protection to the worker, since his benefits will
be paid whether his employer defaults in contributions or not, while in the
"separate accounts" plan, the worker can look only to the fund of his own
employer for the payment of benefits.92  There are arguments on the other
side, however. 3 The Wisconsin plan allows the careful employer to keep con-
tributions at a minimum by keeping a sufficient balance in his account," while
under the New York law the conscientious employer must bear an equal pro-
portion of the burden with the careless employer. The Wisconsin law has a
further advantage in that an employer who guarantees to keep his men em-
ployed for the greater part of the year will be exempted from all contribution.P5
Constitutionality
Since our unemployment insurance structure has been built so rapidly, there
is naturally some doubt whether it has been built well. One question of out-
standing importance is immediately presented. Is unemployment insurance
constitutional? The constitutional provision involved is the "due process"
clause, and the spearhead of an attack upon a state law would be the con-
tention that the law deprives the employer of his "property without due
process of law."9 6 There is no doubt that unemployment insurance does take
a portion of the employers' property. However, the constitutional inhibition
is not violated by a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.PT The
exact scope of this power cannot be accurately defined, and therefore each case
must be decided on its own particular factsYs  It is one of the broadest of
state powers and it extends to the protection of all persons and all property
within the state. 9 The police power is thus described in the case of House
v. Mayes: 0 0
".. . among the powers of the state, not surrendered-which power therefore
remains with the state-is the power to so regulate the relative rights and duties
of all within its jurisdiction so as to guard the public morals, the public safety
92. It is also argued that the administrative machinery required by the separate accounts
plan is cumbersome and expensive. Andrews, Two Acts for the Security of Wage Earrers
(1935) 7 N. Y. B. A. BuL. 188, 190. For a discussion of both plans see DourLAS, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 166.
93. Commons, The Groves Unemployment Reserves Law (1932) 22 A-, LAn. LEG. R %. 8.
94. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, § 108.18. When the employer's account reaches a satisfactory
amount, no further contributions are required.
95. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, § 105.15. It can readily be seen that such a provision would
tend to stabilize employment. The employer would have an incentive for keeping men
at work regularly.
96. U. S. Co-sT. A. aND. XIV.
97. New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 (1894); see Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558 (1914).
98. See Stone v. I"5issisippi, 101 U. S. 814, 818 (1879); Slaughter House Cases, 83
U. S. 36, 62 (1873).
99. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911); see Slaughter House Cases,
83 U. S. 36, 62 (1873).
100. 219 U. S. 270, 282 (1911).
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and the public health, as well as to promote the public safety and the common
good; and that it is with the state to devise the means to be employed to such
,ends, taking care always that the means devised do not go beyond the necessities
of the case, have some real or substantial relation to the objects to be accom-
plished, and are not inconsistent with its own constitution or the Constitution
of the United States."
The question is then narrowed to this extent: is unemployment insurance a
valid exercise of the police power? Any concrete exercise of the power by a
state must have for its object the promotion of the public health, the public
morals, or the public welfare.' 10 This requirement is broad and general in its
terms. It does not confine the liberty of the states within a narrow field, but
includes as well those measures which are designed for the furtherance of public
convenience and prosperity. 0 2 Applying this norm to the unemployment in-
surance laws, only one conclusion may be reached. The purpose of the laws
is to promote the public welfare and prosperity. 10 3 However, the means used
must be reasonably fitted to achieve that purpose; they must have a "real ot
substantial relation to the objects to be accomplished."'1 4 Moreover, the exer-
cise of power must not be unreasonable to the point of becoming arbitrary.1°
In accordance with these principles it has been held that regulations which
compel compliance with public health measures, 10 public safety measures,107
and regulations of the use of property'"8 are within the power of the states.
By the same standards, minimum wage legislation'0 9 and regulation restricting
the resale price of theater tickets 10 have been adjudged unreasonable exercises
of the police power. In each case the factors to be considered are the reason-
101. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306 (1905).
102. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U. S. 561 (1906); see Bacon
v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 317 (1907).
103. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 5bO declares the legislative purpose: "Economic In-
security due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, welfare and morals of
the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general
interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature .... Taking Into
account the report of its own committee, together with facts tending to support it which
are matters of common knowledge, the legislature therefore declares that in its considered
judgment the public good and the well-being of the wage-earners of this state require the
enactment of this measure... 2'
104. See House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 282 (1911).
105. See In re Wilshire, 103 Fed. 620, 622 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1900). However, the courts
will not inquire into the motives prompting the legislation if it appears that the legislature
acted in good faith. See Union Oil Co. v. Portland, 198 Fed. 441, 443 (D. C. Ore. 1912).
106. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1906) (compulsory vaccination law).
107. Union Oil Co. v. Portland, 198 Fed. 441 (D. C. Ore. 1912) (storage of fuel oil
within a city).
108. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U. S. 561 (1906) (compelling
railroad to rebuild bridge).
109. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 5Z5 (1923) (statute setting a minimum
wage for women workers).
110. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927).
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ableness of the law and its fitness to achieve the object for which it was designed.
Factual situations which are analogous to unemployment insurance are to
be found in cases dealing with the constitutionality of workmen's accident
compensation laws. Statutes which give to the employer an election as to the
method of insuring the worker, by contribution to a state fund, by placing
insurance with an independent carrier, or by depositing securities have uni-
formly been held valid.'"' These cases, however, would not be controlling here
since the unemployment laws do not give the employer such an election."-
A statute which gave no election, but compelled contribution to a state
fund, was involved in the case of Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington."2 In
that case the constitutionality of the Washington Workmen's Compensation
Act" 14 was in question. That Act established a state fund, abolished actions
at law by the employee for the negligence of the employer, and substituted
compensation for all injuries arising out of employment. Contributions were
required from employers alone. The fund established was separated into ac-
counts for each industry. It was held by a divided court that the act was a
fair and reasonable exercise of the police power, since, first, the main object of
the legislation was of general and public moment; second, the charges upon
employers were reasonable in amount; and third, the burden was fairly dis-
tributed. The same standards might well be applied to the New York Unem-
ployment Insurance Law. However, the analogy fails in certain respects. In
workmen's compensation cases, the injury for which compensation is given arises
out of the employment," 5 and is to a certain extent caused by the employment,
so that it is not unreasonable to place the entire cost upon the employer. In
the case of unemployment, however, it cannot be said that the lack of employ-
ment arises from or is caused by the employment. The employer is not the
cause of unemployment in the same way that he is the cause of a personal
injury received upon his premises or in the conduct of his business. The
greater part of unemployment is caused by circumstances over which neither
the worker nor the employer has any control. Therefore, it might be argued
that the cost of unemployment is unequally distributed in a system where the
employer alone pays contributions. A further distinction is found in that the
Washington act exempted the employer from liability for private action. 10
This was an essential part of the legislative scheme, and "the quid pro quo for
iii. New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 18 (1917); Hawkins v. Blealdy,
243 U. S. 210 (1917); Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E.
600 (1915).
112. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, § 10S.15 provides that no employer may place insurance
with an independent company. N. Y. LAoR LAw (1935) § 529 provides that the state
fund shall be the sole source of benefits.
113. 243 U. S. 219 (1917).
114. Wash. Laws 1911, C. 74.
115. Gilioti v. Hoffman Catering Co., 246 N. Y. 279, 158 N. E. 621 (1927); Ellamar
Mining Co. v. Possus, 247 Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
116. Wash. Laws 1911, c. 74, § 1.
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the burdens imposed upon him." 1 7 The unemployment acts make no similar
substitution, since they confer no benefit on the employer, and remove no
existing liability.
Perhaps a more complete analogy is found in the case of Noble State Bank
v. Haskell.118 That case dealt with the Oklahoma Bank Guaranty Acts,110
which provided that all banks in the state were to contribute a certain percentage
of deposits to a central fund, which fund would be used to indemnify depositors
of any bank which should become insolvent. The question was whether or not
the contributing banks were deprived of their property without due process of
law. It was held that the law was a reasonable exercise of the state power.
The similarity between this case and the unemployment insurance situation is
that in both instances the contributions are exacted from those who have not
in any way caused the condition for which compensation is given. In both
instances, the evil sought to be remedied is one'of public and general concern.
In both instances, there is no immediate quid pro quo received by the contrib-
uting party. Perhaps this similarity will be a datum on the side of validity
in a constitutional test of unemployment insurance.
In any event, it is generally agreed that the enactment of unemployment
insurance laws by the states is a forward step in the direction of a more com-
plete social security, and that they are destined to become as important in the
history of labor legislation as the workmen's compensation acts of twenty-five
years ago. It is to be hoped that under the guidance of a just administration,
they will fulfill the purpose for which they were designed.
117. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 234 (1917).
118. 219 U. S. 104 (1911).
119. Okla. Laws 1907, c. 6.
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